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Why Do Ethnic Groups rEbEl?
new Data and Analysis
by lArs-Erik cEDErmAn, AnDrEAs WimmEr, and briAn min*
DEspitE its fundamental role in legitimizing the modern state system, nationalism has rarely been linked to the outbreak of po-
litical violence in the recent literature on ethnic conflict and civil war. 
to a large extent, this is because the state is absent from many conven-
tional theories of ethnic conflict. indeed, some studies analyze conflict 
between ethnic groups under conditions of state failure, thus making 
the absence of the state the very core of the causal argument. others 
assume that the state is ethnically neutral and try to relate ethnodemo-
graphic measures, such as fractionalization and polarization, to civil 
war. in contrast to these approaches, we analyze the state as an institu-
tion that is captured to different degrees by representatives of particular 
ethnic communities, and thus we conceive of ethnic wars as the result 
of competing ethnonationalist claims to state power.
While our work relates to a rich research tradition that links the 
causes of such conflicts to the mobilization of ethnic minorities, it also 
goes beyond this tradition by introducing a new data set that addresses 
some of the shortcomings of this tradition. our analysis is based on 
the Ethnic power relations data set (epr), which covers all politically 
relevant ethnic groups and their access to power around the world from 
1946 through 2005. this data set improves significantly on the widely 
used minorities at risk data set, which restricts its sample to mobilized 
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1 complementing the current study, Wimmer, cederman, and min 2009 show that ethic conflict 
results from specific ethnopolitical configurations of power, rather than from ethnic diversity per se. 
they identify three particularly conflict-prone configurations: ethnocracies, states with a high number 
of power-sharing ethnic elites, and incohesive states with a short history of direct rule by the center.
2 posen 1993.
3 hardin 1995; de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999.
minorities and thus largely overlooks the ethnopolitical constellation 
of power at the center.
improved theory and data allow us to show that, contrary to the 
expectations held by many scholars of civil wars, competing ethno-
nationalist claims over the state constitute the driving force behind 
many internal conflicts in the post–World War ii era. While we have 
analyzed this data set at the country level in another publication,1 we 
pursue a more disaggregated, group-level analysis here. We show that 
conflict with the government is more likely to erupt (1) the more repre-
sentatives of an ethnic group are excluded from state power, especially 
if they experienced a loss of power in the recent past, (2) the higher 
their mobilizational capacity is, and (3) the more they have experi-
enced conflict in the past. in view of these findings, we conclude that 
ethnonationalist struggles over access to state power are an important 
part of the dynamics leading to the outbreak of civil wars.
the article is organized as follows. We first review the relevant con-
flict literature and then develop the three main hypotheses that lie at 
the core of our theory. the following section introduces the epr data 
set. the main results are presented in the next section, followed by a 
brief sensitivity analysis and a concluding section.
existing ApproAches to ethnicity And conflict:  
security dilemmA, ethnic frActionAlizAtion, And  
minority mobilizAtion
in order to understand the conflicts that broke out in yugoslav and 
soviet successor states as well as in rwanda during the 1990s, some 
researchers have utilized ideas developed to study interstate relations 
during the cold war. most prominently, posen conceived of ethnic con-
flict as a struggle between ethnic groups in the wake of state collapse.2 
According to neorealist theory, ethnic groups face a security dilemma 
when the leviathan disappears and react with preemptive violence. 
these ideas were subsequently elaborated with the help of rational 
choice models.3
As a consequence of the assumption of state breakdown, however, 
this research tends to overlook the important role played by state actors 
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109990219
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:24:58, subject to the Cambridge Core
 why do ethnic groups rebel? 89
4 collier and hoeffler 2004; Fearon and laitin 2003; for a review, see kalyvas 2007.
5 Fearon and laitin 2003. using different model specifications, other quantitative studies report a 
positive impact of ethnic fractionalization on civil war onset; see sambanis 2001; hegre and sambanis 
2006; blimes 2006.
6 For example, montalvo and reynal-Querol 2005; cf. horowitz 1985.
7 For example, collier and hoeffler 2004.
8 A number of scholars have called for a more disaggregated approach that focuses on microlevel 
mechanisms, for example, kalyvas 2006; for a review, see tarrow 2007. our own approach comple-
ments these studies at a level of analysis that is less detailed yet offers global coverage.
9 posner 2004.
10 chandra and Wilkinson 2008.
11 cederman and Girardin 2007.
12 brass 1991; breuilly 1994; Wimmer 2002.
in generating these conflicts in the first place, as the wars in yugoslavia, 
rwanda, and many other places clearly demonstrate. in the absence of 
state agency, political violence may take the form of communal conflict 
over land or local political dominance but not of full-fledged civil war.
in recent statistical research on civil wars, many scholars argue that 
ethnic grievances are too widespread to explain the rare onset of con-
flict. Wars are more likely, so the argument goes, in states that are too 
weak to suppress rebellions or where natural resources invite warlords 
to enrich themselves by looting.4 research on the basis of this griev-
ance hypothesis has undoubtedly helped to clarify the general condi-
tions that are conducive to civil wars and insurgencies. however, the 
grievance hypothesis has not been tested with adequate data; rather, 
it has been tested with highly aggregated proxies that do not provide 
a direct measure of political inequality along ethnic lines and the re-
sulting “grievances.” Fearon and laitin, for example, examine whether 
there is a statistical association between measures of a country’s “ethnic 
fractionalization” and civil war onset.5 some scholars have worked with 
measures of ethnic polarization that are loosely related to horowitz’s 
theory of ethnic conflict, again without explicit references to the state.6 
others seek to operationalize the concept of ethnic domination but use 
a demographic proxy as well.7
We believe that efforts to grasp the propensity for ethnonationalist 
conflict with the help of macrolevel indices are problematic.8 First, they 
implicitly assume that the ethnic groups listed in the work of anthro-
pologists and linguists are politically relevant.9 second, the macrolevel 
indices describe a country’s demography,10 which may or may not be 
related to the actual constellation of power at the state center.11 Quali-
tative studies of ethnic conflict show that in such cases the state is not 
an ethnically neutral institution but is an active agent of political exclu-
sion that generates these conflicts in the first place.12
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A third stream of research starts from this insight and studies the 
conditions under which minorities will mobilize against the state and 
also the conditions under which such mobilization will turn violent.13 
building on work in the relative deprivation tradition, the minorities 
at risk (mAr) data set established by Gurr and his colleagues remains 
the most prominent data source used to evaluate ethnic mobilizations 
and violence at the group level.14 scholars in this tradition have studied 
the consequences economic, political, and cultural discrimination (see 
below), the settlement patterns that enhance minority mobilization for 
conflict,15 domestic diversion mechanisms,16 the dynamics of seces-
sionist bargaining,17and third-party intervention,18 as well as the role 
of country-level factors, such as government responses to autonomy 
claims by ethnic minorities19 and broader international contextual fac-
tors facilitating ethnic mobilization.20
While the mAr data set allows for empirical testing of mechanisms 
linking group characteristics to conflict propensity, it has its limita-
tions. We note that the mAr-based literature has produced somewhat 
conflicting results regarding the question most relevant to this article: 
whether or not political disadvantage and discrimination increase the 
likelihood of ethnic rebellion. in fact, whereas some studies find that 
political disadvantage has an impact on the likelihood of armed rebel-
lion and secession,21 others find that the degree of political exclusion 
has no effect on secessionism.22 the picture is even more mixed as re-
gards the effect of political discrimination: while regan and norton, 
as well as Walter, find strong evidence that political discrimination in-
creases rebellions and secessionist civil wars,23 Fox fails to find any clear 
relationship for the subset of ethnoreligious groups,24 and Gurr’s study 
of ethnonationalist rebellions in the 1980s even suggests that political 
discrimination is associated with less rather than more conflict.25 olzak 
aggregates mAr data on the country level and arrives at the conclusion 
13 there is also a vast qualitative literature on minority mobilization and ethnonationalist violence; 
see brubaker and laitin 1998.
14 Gurr 1993a; Gurr 2002.
15 toft 2003.
16 tir and Jasinski 2008.
17 Walter 2006a; Jenne 2007.
18 cetinyan 2002; saideman 2002.
19 brancati 2006; Walter 2006b.
20 olzak 2006.
21 For example, Gurr 1993b; Walter 2006b.
22 saideman and Ayers 2000.
23 regan and norton 2005; Walter 2006b.
24 Fox 2000.
25 Gurr 1993b.
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that both formal recognition of ethnic group rights and political dis-
crimination increase the likelihood of conflict.26
clearly, some of these discrepancies can be attributed to differ-
ent research designs and sample definitions, but we suspect that the 
data set’s inherent problems might be responsible for these conflicting 
findings as well. the mAr data set “hardwires” the degree of power 
access into the sample definition by excluding groups in power from 
systematic consideration. this reduces the comparative horizon and 
thus makes it harder to capture the effects of political exclusions in un-
ambiguous ways. moreover, in many countries with dramatic shifts in 
power constellations (chad, Afghanistan, liberia), the political status 
of an ethnic group may change from discriminated minority to ruling 
elite from one period to the next. indeed, studies of ethnonational-
ism should treat ethnic groups’ representation within government as a 
variable rather than as a constant. Finally, focusing on minorities con-
flates the demographic concept of numerical domination with political 
exclusion. Accordingly, the mAr coding scheme does not fit countries 
with ruling minorities or complex coalitions of ethnically defined elites, 
as for example in nigeria, india, or chad, where ethnic conflict will be 
pursued in the name of excluded majorities (rather than minorities) or 
ethnic groups that share power (and are thus not “at risk”).27
in sum, much of the recent literature on ethnic conflict and civil 
wars fails to get the state’s role right. many approaches do not take ac-
count of the state as an actor in conflict processes (as in the security di-
lemma approach), fail to trace the ethnopolitical power constellations 
at the center of state power (as in the minority mobilization school), or 
try to capture ethnopolitical discontent through demographic proxies 
of diversity. these theoretical, sampling, and measurement problems 
hinder the development of precise and testable hypothesis about which 
mechanisms connect ethnonationalist politics to political violence. the 
following section addresses this task.
theorizing ethnonAtionAlist conflict: Actor  
constellAtions, motives, And collective Action
the classical sociological literature on nationalism offers a good start-
ing point for understanding the logic of ethnonationalist conflict. 
26 olzak 2006,124.
27 the mAr data set tries to address these limitations by including five “advantaged” minorities 
that benefit from political discrimination. mAr also comprises a series of “communal contenders” 
mostly in Africa, that is, groups that share power with others while at the same time mobilizing in 
protest or rebellion.
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nationalism can be defined as a political principle that demands that 
the unit of governance and the nation should be congruent. it replaces 
the principle of dynastic sovereignty on which agrarian empires were 
based.28 Whereas the unit of governance is usually understood to be 
the sovereign state, the nation is imagined as a community of common 
origin and shared historical destiny.29
in the modern era the introduction of the principles of national-
ism—that ethnic likes should rule over ethnic likes—has led to waves 
of political mobilizations and a subsequent transformation of the state 
system.30 the ensuing ethnonationalist struggles have taken on a va-
riety of forms: conflict over access to state power between the leaders 
of competing ethnic communities,31 secession from existing states in 
order to establish a new state ruled in the name of a particular ethnic 
group32 or to join another state controlled by ethnic kin,33 and competi-
tion between new states over mixed territories inhabited by members 
of their respective ethnic core groups.34
While this literature helps to explain the broad historical and po-
litical circumstances under which we can expect ethnonationalist mo-
bilization and conflict, it is much less concerned with identifying the 
precise mechanisms through which such ethnonationalist mobilization 
turns violent. only recently have a number of scholars turned to study-
ing nationalist mobilization and conflict in greater detail.35 We selec-
tively draw on this scholarship in order to develop our own model of 
ethnonationalist conflict.
our analytical point of departure is tilly’s polity model, which fea-
tures a political system comprising a government and a number of con-
tenders seeking to maximize their access to executive power.36 members 
of the polity enjoy a privileged position, while those excluded from 
direct access to government represent potential challengers (see Figure 
1). Adapting tilly’s model along the lines proposed by cederman and 
Girardin, we assume that polity members and challengers consist of 
ethnic groups and their leaders (including politically irrelevant groups 
28 Gellner 1983.
29 Anderson 1991.
30 kedourie 1960; breuilly 1994; brubaker 1996; cederman 1997; Wimmer and min 2006.
31 For example, brass 1991; Wimmer 2002.
32 For example, hechter 2001.
33 For example, Weiner 1971.
34 For example, brubaker 1996.
35 For example, beissinger 2002; cederman 1997, chaps. 7, 8; hechter 2000; olzak 2006; Wim-
mer 2002, chap. 3.
36 tilly 1978.
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such as group 4).37 Given the principle of ethnonational representa-
tivity embodied by the modern nation-state, it can be expected that 
challengers seek to avoid the rule of ethnic others by gaining access 
to the polity or leaving it in favor of a new polity or an already exist-
ing kin state. power holders should want to maximize their share of 
state power—thus opening the possibility of infighting among power-
sharing partners.
civil wars confront incumbent governments with political and mili-
tary organizations that challenge the governments’ claim to sovereign 
rule. this situation corresponds to standard definitions of civil war38 but 
excludes communal conflicts or pogroms in which the state plays less 
of an active role. in conflicts that are fought in the name of excluded 
groups, rebel movements are composed of mobilized and militarized 
37 cederman and Girardin 2007 refer to “Ethnic Groups in power” (egips) and “marginalized 
Ethnic Groups” (megs).
38 sambanis 2004; kalyvas 2007.
figure 1 
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organizations that challenge the government. in the case of challenges 
launched in the name of groups that are already represented within 
government, other actors such as a faction within the army or newly 
created political organizations and militias might instigate a violent 
confrontation.
having identified the main actors and the types of conflicts they may 
provoke, we now consider the conditions under which violence is most 
likely to erupt. We first study which groups will be more motivated to 
support a rebellion against ethnic domination by others. indeed, many 
aggrieved groups have not produced militant rebel organizations. We 
therefore have to identify those groups that perceive the government as 
particularly illegitimate and are therefore more inclined to support re-
bellions. second, we consider a group’s organizational capacity to chal-
lenge incumbent state power because high levels of motivation alone 
will not suffice to produce an armed organization willing to take on the 
government army. Finally, rather than constituting historical singulari-
ties, political violence often leaves traces that put nationalist politics 
on a contentious track. We therefore need to identify such potential 
effects of path dependency. in the following, we consider the causal 
mechanisms associated with each of these three mechanisms in turn.
most motivAted groups: excluded, downgrAded,  
And underrepresented
to specify motives and identify the most motivated actors, we draw 
on Wimmer’s institutionalist approach to nationalism and ethnic poli-
tics, which assumes that rulers in modern nation-states are no longer 
legitimized by the principles of dynastic succession, God’s grace, or 
civilizational progress but that they are expected to care for their own, 
ethnically defined people.39 political officeholders thus have institu-
tional incentives to gain legitimacy by favoring coethnics over others 
when it comes to the distribution of public goods and government jobs. 
the expectation of ethnic preference works in the other direction as 
well, as voters prefer parties led by coethnics, delinquents hope for co-
ethnic judges, and citizens prefer to be policed by coethnics.
under the conditions of pervasive ethnic favoritism, political lead-
ers and followers are driven by the strategic motive to avoid or even 
to overturn dominance by ethnic “others.” this motive is simultane-
ously material, political, and symbolic: “adequate” or “just” representa-
tion in a central government offers material advantages such as access 
39 Wimmer 2002.
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to government jobs and services, legal advantages such as the benefits 
of full citizenship rights, a fair trial, and protection from arbitrary vio-
lence, and symbolic advantages such as the prestige of belonging to a 
“state-owning” ethnic group. in brief, this approach conceives of ethnic 
politics as the struggle over control of the state between various ethni-
cally defined organizations and their constituencies. Especially in weak 
states with weakly developed civil societies, the state may be captured 
by particular ethnic elites and their constituencies, thus giving rise to 
one among other variants of the “weak state–strong society” constella-
tion analyzed by midgal and others. 40
it follows that groups that lose out in this struggle for state power 
are more fertile breeding grounds for organizations that challenge the 
government. We postulate a direct relationship between the degree of 
state power and the likelihood that an armed rebellion will be instigated 
in the name of that particular group. the most excluded groups will thus 
be most likely to support armed organizations that challenge the gov-
ernment. Given nationalist principles of political legitimacy, feelings of 
resentment will be widespread and can be channeled into successful col-
lective action.41 We summarize this reasoning in a first hypothesis:
—h1a. the probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases the more 
representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from central executive 
power.
the exclusion mechanism also alerts us to the consequences of 
changes in power hierarchies. sociological theories of emotions sug-
gest that negative emotions are especially likely to be aroused following 
loss of power and prestige.42 When the subjects blame others for their 
downgrading, anger and resentment increase the readiness to fight in 
order to change the situation.43 We postulate a similar mechanism at 
the level of collective organizations: leaders of ethnonationalist orga-
nizations will be most likely to resort to violence if they have recently 
experienced a loss of relative power. they can channel the resentment 
of their constituencies and mobilize to “reverse a reversal.”44 this rea-
soning leads to the following hypothesis:
40 migdal 1988; see also Jackman 1993.
41 petersen 2002.
42 kemper 1978.
43 turner and stets 2005, 217.
44 petersen 2002, 173. the mAr data set includes an indicator for “lost autonomy” that is associ-
ated with rebellions; see Gurr 2000, 230; saideman and Ayres 2000; Walter 2006b. note, however, 
that our hypothesis concerns all types of status reversals, including exclusion or demotion that were 
not preceded by autonomous status.
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—h1b. the probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases follow-
ing a fall in power status that decreases access to central executive power 
by representatives of an ethnic group.
Finally, the principle of ethnic representativity of modern nation-
states is also violated if groups in power are “underrepresented” in com-
parison with other power-sharing partners. When smaller groups wield 
more power than larger groups, representatives of the larger groups can 
portray the situation as unfair and stir up fear of ethnic domination 
among their constituents.45 thus, we have the next hypothesis.
—h1c. the probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases if the 
ethnic group represented by a power-sharing partner is larger compared 
with that of more powerful coalition partners.
mobilizAtionAl cApAcity: group size
collective action theory tells us that group motivations are insufficient 
to produce political mobilization and violent contestation.46 the moti-
vational forces described above are thus a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
cause for ethnic conflict. successful mobilization requires both motivation 
and organizational capacity.47 While neoclassical collective action theory 
in the olsonian tradition expects free riding in large groups, nationalists 
may overcome such dilemmas through intragroup monitoring, by relying 
on preexisting social networks, and by mobilizing identity-related co-
operation norms.48 Following resource mobilization theory, we postulate 
that larger excluded groups are even more able to challenge a govern-
ment because they can draw on their superior numbers to recruit fighters 
and have a larger potential resource pool to sustain an organizational 
infrastructure.49 As argued by cederman, buhaug, and rød, the politi-
cal claims of larger ethnic groups also enjoy more legitimacy: given the 
principles of representativity that underlie the nation-state, the exclusion 
of large sections of the population from power is more scandalous than 
the exclusion of smaller groups, and minority-ruled states (ethnocracies) 
are among the least legitimate political regimes in the modern world.50 
based on this argument, we postulate the next hypothesis.
—h2. the probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases with the 
ethnic group’s relative demographic size.
45 For a general argument based on intergroup comparison, see horowitz 1985; and Gurr 2000.
46 mccarthy and Zald 1977; tilly 1978; tilly and tarrow 2006.
47 Gurr 2000.
48 hechter and okamoto 2001. Furthermore, free riding may be less problematic in many civil war 
situations because of the risks associated with nonparticipation; see kalyvas and kocher 2007.
49 mccarthy and Zald 1977; Denardo 1985.
50 cederman, buhaug, and rød 2009; see also cederman 1997, chap. 8; petersen 2002, 51.
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history mAtters: the influence of pAst conflict
Ethnonationalist mobilization and contestation are macrohistorical 
processes that operate over both short51 and long time spans.52 it may 
take decades until perceived humiliation and unfair ethnic status hi-
erarchies give rise to political mobilization and conflict. thus, rather 
than being an instant and ahistorical phenomenon, nationalist mobi-
lization takes place in a historical context that might be characterized 
by previous episodes of ethnonationalist violence. in extreme cases of 
path dependency, actors may find themselves trapped in self-sustaining 
cycles of violence.
We postulate that past conflicts influence the likelihood of present 
conflict through three mechanisms. First, ethnonationalist activists at-
tempt to glorify their group’s history through one-sided narratives that 
stress their own victories and attribute blame for military losses to trai-
tors, weak-spirited leaders, or a ruthless enemy. this implies that leaders 
might not update their risk assessments and might take up arms again 
even when the chances of winning have not improved significantly.53 
second, past experiences of traumatic violence may live on as a part of 
oral tradition or they may sometimes be perpetuated in official history 
textbooks and public rituals, nourishing calls for revenge.54 third, prior 
exposure to combat means that violence is no longer unthinkable but 
constitutes part of the accepted repertoire of action and may help create 
organizational structures and identities that can be reactivated at later 
points in history or even create a culture of violence.55 We express these 
three mechanisms of path dependency in our third main hypothesis.
—h3. the probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases with the 
number of prior conflicts fought in the name of the same ethnic group.
needless to say, this set of hypotheses does not exhaust the links be-
tween ethnicity and internal conflict. properties of ethnic groups, such 
as concentrated settlement patterns,56 cohesive internal structure,57 and 
51 beissinger 2002.
52 Wimmer and min 2006.
53 rydgren 2007.
54 kalyvas 2007.
55 laitin 1995; Waldman 2004. For alternative explanations of recurrent warfare, see Walter 2004. 
conflict experiences involving other groups may also increase the likelihood of ethnonationalist vio-
lence through diffusion mechanisms; see lake and rothchild 1998.
56 using the greg (Geo-referencing Ethnic Groups) data set, which is based on a geo-coded ver-
sion of the Atlas Narodov Mira, Weidmann 2009 shows that there is a strong link between settlement 
concentration and conflict, thus confirming toft 2003. Data collection that will provide a gis-based 
version of epr is under way.
57 tilly 1978; Gurr 2000.
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availability of external support,58 are known to increase the probability 
of civil wars, but investigating these factors requires data that are pres-
ently unavailable in our data set.
before operationalizing and testing our main hypotheses, we turn to 
the data set that underlies this study. Evaluating the theory calls for data 
that code access to executive power for representatives of different ethnic 
groups, as well as the conflicts in which they have been involved.
meAsuring ethnic power relAtions
the Ethnic power relations (epr) data set identifies all politically rel-
evant ethnic groups and their access to state power in all years from 1946 
to 2005.59 in collecting the data, we relied on the expert input of nearly 
one hundred students of ethnic politics to assess formal and informal 
degrees of political participation and exclusion along ethnic lines.60 in 
line with most other data sources on ethnic politics including mAr, the 
current data set takes ethnic groups as units of observation, rather than 
political organizations that claim to speak in their name.61 this data set 
improves significantly on previous efforts to code ethnic groups’ access to 
power, such as that of cederman and Girardin, who rely on static mea-
sures of inclusion and limit their sample to Eurasia and north Africa.62
politicAlly relevAnt ethnic groups
We define ethnicity as any subjectively experienced sense of commonal-
ity based on the belief in common ancestry and shared culture.63 Differ-
58 the coding of transborder links among groups represented in epr is in progress. based on the 
greg data set, cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch 2009 find a size-dependent kin effect within Eur-
asia. For a more general treatment of transnational factors of civil wars, see salehyan 2009.
59 the epr data set, which can be downloaded from http://dvn-iq.harvard.edu/dvn.dv/epr, is de-
scribed fully with complete coding rules in min, cederman, and Wimmer 2009 and in an online appen-
dix. the data set includes politically relevant ethnic groups in all 155 sovereign states with a population 
of at least one million and a surface area of at least five thousand square kilometers as of 2005.
60 the process of contacting and interacting with country experts took almost two years. once 
sufficient coding responses were available, workshops were held to decide on the final coding. We 
discussed each coding in light of comments from the experts present, as well as of information from 
additional data sources and the accumulating comparative knowledge of the project team itself.
61 the main reason for this methodological decision is that governmental and rebel organizations 
are much more prone to change (for example, through processes of fusion, fission, exit, and entry) than 
politically relevant ethnic groups, requiring more intricate organization-level data than are currently 
available (but see the preliminary efforts currently under way at mAr). recently efforts have been 
made to code nonstate actors in civil wars, but in such cases the focus is on rebel organizations and 
thus excludes political organizations in nonconflict cases; see, for example, cunningham, Gleditsch, 
and salehyan 2009.
62 cederman and Girardin 2007; buhaug, cederman, and rød 2008; though see cederman, bu-
haug, and rød 2009 for a global analysis.
63 Weber 1978, 385–98. the following definition of ethnicity relies on Wimmer 2008.
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ent markers may be used to indicate such shared ancestry and culture: 
common language, similar phenotypical features, adherence to the 
same faith, and so on.64 Ethnic groups might be hierarchically nested; 
that is, they may comprise several levels of differentiation, not all of 
which are necessarily politically relevant. We classify an ethnic group 
as politically relevant if at least one political organization claims to rep-
resent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led 
political discrimination.65 Discrimination is defined as political exclu-
sion directly targeted at an ethnic community—thus disregarding indi-
rect discrimination based, for example, on educational disadvantage or 
discrimination in the labour or credit markets. the coding rules allow 
for the identification of countries or specific periods in which national 
politics was framed in nonethnic terms.66
to capture temporal changes in the set of politically relevant groups 
and their access to political power, the sample period from 1946 to 2005 
was divided into subperiods, for which separate codings were provided. 
the next important step was to code the degree of access to power by 
the political leaders representing these various ethnic communities.
coding Access to power
the power-access coding is limited to executive power only.67 Depend-
ing on a given country’s power constellations, executive power amounts 
to control over the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the ad-
ministration, including the army. Experts were encouraged to capture the 
most relevant dimension (for example, in a military dictatorship, power 
over the army, and in presidential systems, the presidency, and so on). We 
were interested primarily in major power shifts rather than day-to-day 
reorganizations of cabinets, limiting ourselves to absolute access to power 
irrespective of demographic underrepresentation or overrepresentation.
All politically relevant ethnic groups were categorized according 
to (1) whether those who claimed to represent a group’s interest held 
full control of the executive branch with no meaningful participation 
64 We thus include ethnolinguistic, ethnosomatic (or “racial”), and ethnoreligious groups in our 
definition of ethnicity, but we exclude tribes and clans that define community in genealogical terms, as 
well as regions that do not define commonality on the basis of shared ancestry.
65 it should be noted that political relevance does not equal violent conflict. Endogeneity is not a 
problem because only a tiny fraction of years with mobilized or discriminated groups were character-
ized by conflict (0.45 percent); cf. posner 2004.
66 We did not distinguish between degrees of representativity of political actors who claim to speak 
in the name of an ethnic group; nor did we code the heterogeneity of political positions voiced by 
leaders claiming to represent the same community. cf. brubaker 2004.
67 this choice was made in order to limit the coding effort. legislative politics may also influence 
the likelihood of conflict through ethnic political parties and specific types of electoral institutions; 
see, for example, cohen 1997; brancati 2006; and birnir 2007.
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by members of any other group, (2) whether they divided power with 
members of other groups in a power-sharing regime, or (3) whether 
they were excluded altogether from decision-making authority within 
the halls of central state power. Within each of these categories, coders 
were asked to differentiate between further subtypes.
Absolute power
in this case, the political elites that claim to represent an ethnic group 
do not significantly share power with other political leaders. there are 
two possibilities:
—Monopoly. Elite members hold monopoly power in the executive to 
the exclusion of members other ethnic groups.
—Dominance. Elite members of the group hold dominant power in 
the executive but there is some limited inclusion of “token” members of 
other groups.
power-shAring regimes
by power sharing, we mean any formal or informal arrangement that 
divides executive power among leaders who claim to represent particu-
lar ethnic groups. Depending on the relative importance of the posi-
tions controlled by group representatives, there are two possibilities:
—Senior Partner. representatives participate as senior in a formal or 
informal power-sharing arrangement.
—Junior Partner. representatives participate as junior partners in 
government.
exclusion from centrAl power
Finally, if political leaders who claim to represent a particular ethnic 
category are excluded from participation in central government, we dis-
tinguish between four possibilities:
—Regional Autonomy. Elite members of the group have no central 
power but some influence at the substate level, that is, one level below 
the central government. this may be the substate, the provincial, or the 
district (though not the local) level, depending on the vertical organiza-
tion of the state.
—Separatist Autonomy. A related case is when local governments 
controlled by representatives of an ethnic category have declared their 
territory to be independent from the central government. this category 
differs fundamentally from “regional autonomy” in that group represen-
tatives have often excluded themselves from central state power.
—Powerless. Elite representatives hold no political power at either 
the national or the regional level without being explicitly discriminated 
against.
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—Discrimination. Group members are subjected to active, inten-
tional, and targeted discrimination, with the intent of excluding them 
from both regional and national power. such active discrimination can 
be either formal or informal. 68
conflict coding
our coding of conflict is based upon the ucdp/prio Armed conflicts 
Dataset, which defines internal conflict as any armed and organized 
confrontation between government troops and rebel organizations or 
between army factions that reaches an annual battle death threshold 
of twenty-five.69 this definition excludes one-sided conflicts, such as 
massacres and genocides, as well as communal riots, pogroms, and 
other nonstate conflicts.70
For each conflict, we coded whether actors pursued ethnonationalist 
aims and whether they pursued secessionist objectives: Ethnic/Nonethnic 
Conflicts were distinguished by the aims of the armed organization on 
the one hand and their recruitment and alliance structures on the other 
hand. Ethnic aims include self-determination, more influence for one’s 
group over government, autonomy, and language and other cultural 
rights. regarding recruitment and alliance structures, we defined eth-
nic wars as fought by armed organizations who predominantly recruit 
fighters among their leaders’ own ethnic group and who forge alliances 
on the basis of ethnic affiliation. For a conflict to be classified as ethnic, 
armed organizations must both explicitly pursue ethnonationalist aims 
and recruit fighters and forge alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliations.
All ethnic conflicts were then linked to the politically relevant eth-
nic group in the name of which an armed organization instigated the 
conflict. We looked at the aims and recruitment patterns of each armed 
organization separately. in some complex cases (as in Afghanistan, 
burma, chad, uganda, Angola, and Zaire), we disaggregated a conflict 
into several war fronts when different ethnic claims were made on the 
nongovernmental side. this was also necessary when the constellation 
of rebel organizations and the ethnic communities they represented 
changed dramatically over time.71
our data set includes 124 ethnic conflicts fought between 1946 and 
2005. Given that some of these ethnic conflicts were fought by more 
68 We did not include exclusion of noncitizens from power, as long as these noncitizens hold pass-
ports of other states and are effectively able to return to their country of origin.
69 Gleditsch et al. 2002.
70 We drew primarily on version 3-2005b of the Acd data set, which provides two levels of conflict 
identification, a more general war id number, and a disaggregated sub-id.
71 to avoid endogeneity, the power-access coding always reflects the situation before conflict onset 
in years that feature both conflict outbreak and power-status changes.
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than one group, we identify 146 group-level instances of ethnic conflict 
onset. Among these, 27 were fought by groups in power, 87 by power-
less or discriminated groups, and 32 by autonomous groups. half of 
these conflicts reached the standard threshold of civil war (that is, more 
than one thousand battle deaths in a year). in addition, the data set in-
cludes a distinction between secessionist and nonsecessionist conflict, 
to which we will return in our analysis of elite infighting.
vAriAble definitions And dAtA sources
Drawing on the epr data set, we test all three hypotheses by measuring 
power access (h1a,b,c), mobilizational capacity (h2), and prior con-
flict (h3) for each politically relevant ethnic group in each year from 
1946 to 2005.
the Excluded variable is a dichotomous indicator that indicates 
whether representatives of an ethnic category are discriminated against, 
are powerless, or have regional or separatist autonomy (h1a). to pres-
ent a more nuanced picture, we also use dummy variables referring to 
specific epr categories, that is, Junior Partner, Regional Autonomy, Sepa-
ratist Autonomy, Powerless, and Discriminated. A Downgraded dummy 
variable identifies whether representatives of a group have experienced 
a decrease in power status during the previous two years (h1b), based 
on the epr power-status categories. in our analysis of elite infighting, 
we add the Underrepresented variable, which indicates whether a junior 
coalition partner represents a larger ethnic group than a senior partner 
(h1c).
Furthermore, we evaluate group size with the logged variable Group 
Size, which uses the epr estimate of demographic group size as a pro-
portion of the total population of the country’s politically relevant eth-
nic groups (h2). in order to test the influence of prior conflict, we use 
a variable Past Conflict that counts the number of conflicts that have 
already been fought in the name of the same ethnic group since the 
beginning of the sample period (h3). Finally, Peace Years counts the 
number of peaceful years since the last conflict or the beginning of the 
sample period.72
in order to control for country-level characteristics, we use two con-
trol variables throughout the article. based on extensive robustness 
analysis, hegre and sambanis conclude that variables measuring wealth 
and population size have a powerful effect on civil war onset.73 there-
72 Following beck, katz, and tucker 1998, this indicator is tested together with three cubic 
splines.
73 hegre and sambanis 2006.
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fore we include measures of logged gdp per Capita and logged country 
Population Size, drawn from the penn World tables and World bank 
sources. While several interpretations have been offered of the effects 
of income, our theory of ethnic politics expects that richer countries 
should have less conflict because they can afford to solve political con-
flicts through redistribution.74 Although a country’s population size is 
usually significant in country-level studies of civil war onset, it is less 
clear what to expect here, especially since its robustness may simply 
reflect the fact that, all else equal, conflicts are more likely to occur in 
larger countries.
dAtA AnAlysis
We are now ready for a first evaluation of our three hypotheses relating 
to power access, mobilization capacity, and past conflict. the current 
section introduces statistical models that concern groups in all power-
status categories, as well as more specific analysis of insurgencies in the 
name of excluded groups and infighting among power-sharing part-
ners, since some of our causal mechanisms relate to specific actor types 
only.
descriptive AnAlysis
our data set is structured in a group-country-year format, with 29,519 
unique observations, including all politically relevant ethnic groups. 
table 1 offers a first empirical assessment of the power-access hypoth-
esis, h1. As expected, the frequency of conflict increases roughly with 
the degree of exclusion. Excluded groups are much more likely to ex-
perience a rebellion in their name (0.66 percent) compared with groups 
in power (0.23 percent). A χ2-test confirms that this relationship is 
significant at p = 0.0001. With the exception of the category Regional 
Autonomy, which exhibits relatively less conflict than the power-sharing 
categories, the table also reveals that the conflict frequency falls steadily 
with increasing access from executive power. because Separatist Au-
tonomy differs from the other excluded categories in that the group has 
chosen to “exclude itself ” from central state power, we list these at the 
end of the exclusion category.75
74 Wimmer, cederman, and min 2009; cf. sambanis 2004.
75 because all separatist groups get involved in violence at some point, the coding of regional 
versus separatist autonomy was verified case by case. removing the separatist cases from the data set 
makes no difference to our other findings.
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Going beyond descriptive statistics, we proceed with regression 
analysis to test the main hypotheses. our standard framework consists 
of logit models with ethnic conflict onset as a dichotomous dependent 
variable. because the causal logic during wars can be expected to dif-
fer from what it is in peacetime, we drop observations in which a war 
is currently ongoing and study only the risk of conflict onset during 
peacetime years. to account for the nonindependence of observations 
within countries, we present robust standard errors, clustered on the 
country unit.
AnAlysis of All groups
our main results are presented in table 2. using group-years as the 
unit of analysis, our analysis begins by including all politically relevant 
groups, except those that enjoyed monopoly or Dominant status and 
by definition could not be associated with conflict against the state (see 
the first two columns). in order to operationalize the basic power ac-
cess hypothesis, h1a, model 1 uses the Excluded dummy variable to 
identify those groups that have no access to central power. based on 
this dichotomization, it is clear that rebellions in the name of excluded 
groups are much more likely than conflict in the name of included 
groups, thus supporting h1a. the Downgraded measure, which tests 
hypothesis h1b, is also strongly confirmed in this analysis. in this case, 
the corresponding binary variable has an even stronger effect than the 
static exclusion measure. turning to the test of the mobilization capac-
ity hypothesis, h2, we also find solid evidence that, ceteris paribus, 
tAble 1
ethnic groups’ conflict propensity by cAtegory of power Access
Group Years Years of Ethnic-Conflict Onset
included Groups 11,622   27 0.23%
 monopolya 1,672 n/a n/a
 Dominanta 1,709 n/a n/a
senior partner 2,884     9 0.31%
Junior partner 5,357   18 0.34%
Excluded Groups 17,897 119 0.66%
regional Autonomy 5,433   13 0.24%
powerless 7,482   45 0.60%
Discriminated 4,506   42 0.93%
separatist Autonomy 476   19 3.99%
total 29,519 146 0.46%
a no rebellion, by definition.
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larger groups are more likely to experience a rebellion fought in their 
name. the analysis also confirms our path-dependency hypothesis, 
h3. As expected, the impact of Past Conflict is both large and signif-
icant. We also observe that the hazard rate declines during peaceful 
periods.
tAble 2
explAining group-level ethnonAtionAlist conflict
 (1) (2) (3) (4)







Junior partner 0.3224 –0.1693
(0.4056) (0.3926)








Downgraded 1.6419** 1.7590** 1.8211** 1.7526*
(0.3933) (0.3920) (0.4387) (0.8353)
log (Group size) 0.2902** 0.3015** 0.3559** –0.1834
(0.0783) (0.0829) (0.0926) (0.2468)
underrepresented 0.1397**
(0.0321)
past conflict 0.8545** 0.6309** 0.6148 0.6477
(0.1727) (0.2387) (0.3245) (0.5621)
log (gdp per capita), lagged –0.3675** –0.3346** –0.3396** –0.2181
(0.1023) (0.0920) (0.1175) (0.1545)
log (population), lagged –0.0046 0.0220 0.0766 –0.1138
(0.0958) (0.0918) (0.1141) (0.1158)
years since last conflict 
onset
–0.1542* 
        (0.0725)
–0.1398 
        (0.0748)
–0.1592 
        (0.0840)
–0.0112 
       (0.1797)
peace years splines yes yes yes yes
constant –3.3042** –4.1166** –3.8561* –2.7547
(1.2077) (1.2531) (1.6007) (2.0233)
observations 24445 24445 16498 7947
robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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regarding the control variables, higher levels of gdp per Capita have 
a strong, negative influence on conflict onset. however, Population, 
which usually has strong effects in country-level analyses, fails to ex-
hibit any significant or substantive effect.
As a way to compare the marginal effect of our key variables, we 
plot the difference that our main variables have on predicted conflict 
probabilities, holding other variables at their mean or modal values. 
Figure 2 displays the conflict propensities associated with included and 
excluded groups as a function of gdp per Capita. For both categories we 
observe an income effect, with higher risks of violent rebellion in coun-
tries with lower incomes, in line with previous findings. however, it is 
notable that excluded groups across all income levels are three times 
more likely to initiate conflict against the state as compared with in-
cluded groups that enjoy representation at the center. the substantive 
effects of exclusion are especially pronounced in poor countries, where 
the already high baseline risk of violence is compounded for excluded 
groups. our explanation is that in poor countries governments lack the 
resources necessary to co-opt leaders of protest movements that fuel 
resentment because of their exclusion from central government. since 
the central state is all-decisive in poor countries, groups that lack rep-
resentation and are marginalized in the distribution of state resources, 
government jobs, and public goods may have greater motives to take 
up arms.76 While not plotted in the figure, our other key variables also 
have very large effects on the risk of conflict: a downgraded power sta-
tus and prior conflict history increases the likelihood of a conflict by 
5.3 and 2.4 times respectively in comparison with included groups.
in a further effort to investigate h1a, model 2 introduces the more 
fine-grained power-access categories. it shows that the conflict-inducing 
impact of exclusion from state power represents more of a continuum 
than a dichotomy. According to our theory, conflict proneness should 
decrease gradually as the access of ethnic leaders to state power improves. 
indeed, this is what we find. the coefficients range from a low and in-
significant 0.32 for junior partners up to a highly significant 1.67 for 
discriminated groups and 3.25 for separatists. the latter category is es-
pecially conflict prone, not merely because of high motivation but also 
because separatism challenges the state to the highest possible degree, 
given that modern states are built on the principle of territorial sover-
eignty. Again, hypotheses h1b, h2, and h3 are powerfully confirmed 
and the effect of the control variables remains virtually unchanged.
76 cf. Wimmer 2002, chap. 3.
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so far, we have considered the relationship of all groups with the 
government, but there are reasons to believe that ethnic elites behave 
differently, depending on whether or not they are already represented 
in the central government. therefore, we now consider excluded and 
included groups separately to identify the relation-specific effects that 
are partially concealed in the general analysis.
AnAlysis of excluded groups
once we restrict our analysis to rebellions in the name of excluded 
groups, we are able to specify a clear-cut actor constellation based on a 
center-periphery logic. model 3 in table 2 presents the empirical results 
of this analysis. Given the focus on excluded groups, we find smaller 
differences among the power-status categories. however, both Discrim-
ination and Separatist Autonomy can be statistically distinguished from 
the baseline category Regional Autonomy, thus supporting hypothesis 
h1a. A recent Downgraded power status among these excluded groups 
increases conflict propensity significantly, in line with h1b. compared 
with the general analysis, we find even more unambiguous evidence 
that large groups are more likely to experience conflict (h2). the in-
fluence of Prior Conflict remains significant (h3). Finally, the control 
variables behave similarly to the results noted in models 1 and 2.
figure 2 
the effect of gdp per cApitA on ethnic groups’  
conflict propensity a
a shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3 offers a graphic depiction of how mobilizational capacity 
influences the risk of conflict for excluded groups. the plots, based on 
model 1, show that larger groups are more likely to initiate rebellion 
and that the risks are substantially higher for excluded groups that have 
had a prior conflict or have recently been downgraded in their power 
status. the effects of being downgraded are especially pronounced, 
though the effects are imprecisely estimated for larger group sizes.
AnAlysis of included groups
Finally, we shift our attention from excluded to included groups. here 
we consider only cases of power sharing, that is, those that involve se-
nior and junior partners of governing coalitions, because monopoly and 
dominant groups are directly identified with the government and thus 
by definition cannot challenge it. our goal therefore is to understand 
why some power-sharing partners initiate conflict against a govern-
ment in which they are represented. Following our hypothesis h1b 
and h1c, we expect that underrepresented power-sharing partners as 
well as those who have experienced a downgrading in their power posi-
tion will be more likely to take up arms against other members of the 
governing coalition.
before discussing results, a cautionary remark is in order. As indi-
cated in table 1, there are very few cases of conflict instigated in the 
name of groups in power, only 27 onsets in 8,241 group-years. this 
means that the results of the statistical evaluation are likely to be sensi-
tive to the coding of this small number of conflict events. With this 
caveat in mind, we turn to model 4 in table 2. the results indicate that 
conflicts in the name of junior partner groups are not more frequent 
than those fought in the name of senior partners (h1a). however, the 
regression analysis suggests that a downgraded power status has an im-
pact on conflict behavior, thus confirming h1b. We also get strong 
results for hypothesis h1c that relate to resentment caused by under-
representation within governing coalitions. Group size has no influence 
on the dependent variable in contrast to the effect for excluded groups 
in models 1–3, suggesting that the mobilizational capacity argument 
does not hold for groups that already have access to the organizational 
apparatus of government. Furthermore, the path-dependency effect 
(h3) cannot be confirmed for the current subsample. Finally, we fail to 
find any significant effect for any of the control variables.
Given the rarity of conflict among groups in power, it is appropriate 
to examine individual cases. in particular, it should be noted that the 
events influencing the coefficients on downgraded power status (h1b) 
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and underrepresentation (h1c) refer to cases of nonsecessionist con-
flict only. the ten secessionist conflicts are not well predicted by our 
model. typically, these secessionist conflicts involved radicalized splin-
ter groups that were dissatisfied with the power-sharing deal offered by 
the government and therefore resorted to violence; among these groups 
were the united liberation Front of Assam,77 the sikh sangat organi-
zation,78 or the Albanian uck/klA rebels in macedonia.79 these cases 
illustrate a general limitation of our research design. Different organi-
zations claim to represent the interests of an ethnic group, and if one 
organization participates in government, this does not prevent others 
from taking an oppositional stand to mount a rebellion in the name of 
“true” group interests. From a theoretical perspective, this outcome is 
not surprising because it is, after all, parties and their representatives 





the effect of excluded ethnic groups’ size on their  
conflict propensity a
a shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
 0         20         40        60          80       100 
size of Group (%)
 0         20         40        60          80       100 





















































terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109990219
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:24:58, subject to the Cambridge Core
110 world politics 
in other cases, the fear of future domination by coalition partners 
triggered secessionist bids that turned violent, as in former yugoslavia 
and bosnia and herzegovina.80 in principle, the fear of domination 
by ethnic others in the future—rather than its actual experience—is 
consistent with our theory, although it cannot be captured with exist-
ing indicators without addressing severe endogeneity problems. in a 
complementary analysis on the country level, we show that such fears 
and the corresponding secessionist conflicts are more likely in states 
with a short history of direct rule by the political center.81
the seventeen nonsecessionist instances of elite infighting are 
somewhat more numerous but still warrant case-by-case analysis. how 
supportive is the evidence in favor of the main hypotheses relating to 
a fall in power status (h1b)? We find only two instances of conflicts 
within two years of a downgraded power status. After a long period of 
dominance by president Eyadéma, who favored his own kabré group 
in togo’s army and administration, he came under pressure to democ-
ratize and had to agree to power sharing in 1991. Despite their status 
as senior partner, he and his entourage in the army became unhappy 
with the power-sharing arrangement and launched a coup later that 
same year. meanwhile, the 1984 coup in cameroon can be seen as a 
reaction to the shift of power from the Fulani-dominated regime of 
president Ahidjo to the government of biya, a beti politician.82
regarding conflicts driven by underrepresentation within the gov-
erning coalition (h1c), the data point us to three potential cases, namely, 
the sara 1991 rebellion in chad, the hutu 1991 uprising in burundi, 
and shiite participation in the lebanese civil war in 1975. rather than 
being directly motivated by underrepresentation, the first of these three 
conflicts appears to be more related to long-term frustrations felt by 
the sara, who had dominated the state’s early history from indepen-
dence in 1960 through 1978,83 and thus is in line with the downgrad-
ing hypothesis (h1b).84 in the other two events, however, the conflict 
is indeed related to the underrepresentation mechanism. in 1991 reb-
els who claimed to represent the hutu majority launched an armed 
struggle against the tutsi-dominated power-sharing arrangement.85 
in lebanon, the shiite political elite were increasingly resentful that 
the maronites were overrepresented in the traditional consociational 
80 kalyvas and sambanis 2005.
81 Wimmer, cederman, and min 2009.
82 mehler 1993.
83 Decalo 1980.
84 the Downgraded variable does not pick up this case because it is based on a two-year window.
85 lemarchand 1994.
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arrangement guaranteeing them the presidency, especially because the 
share of the shiite population had increased in prior decades.86
According to our data, the influence of past civil conflict plays a role 
in some cases of elite infighting. there are obvious instances, such as 
the rebellions in chad that happened against the backdrop of a long-
lasting civil war. nor can there be any doubt that the hutu defection 
from the tutsi-dominated governing coalition in 1991 was influenced 
by memories of past massacres. A similar argument can be made with 
respect to the failure of the power-sharing arrangement in lebanon 
in 1975, because shiite and sunni leaders had already mobilized their 
constituencies in the conflict against the maronite elite in 1958. in all 
three cases the past conflict variable thus picks up meaningful histori-
cal processes.
to sum up, the historical evidence in support of model 4 is strong, 
although the results are driven exclusively by nonsecessionist conflicts. 
the hypotheses relating to the downgrading and underrepresentation 
mechanisms (h1b,c) are tentatively supported by a case-by-case in-
spection of the nonsecessionist cases of elite infighting.
sensitivity AnAlysis
table 3 presents robustness checks of our primary findings based on 
model 1 of table 2. We start by considering the robustness of model 
1 to the inclusion of dummy variables that divide countries into six 
world regions, using the Western states as the reference category (see 
model 5). the regional coefficients for north Africa and the middle 
East, sub-saharan Africa, and Asia are positive and significant at the 
p = 0.10 level. more important, we do not detect any major differences 
in the effect of our main explanatory variables: exclusion, downgraded, 
group size, and conflict history remain powerful even after controlling 
for differences across world regions (see hypotheses 1–3). in contrast, 
the gdp variable loses some of its impact and is now significant at the 
p = 0.053 level.
to further control for local-level factors, we introduce a model with 
country fixed effects (see model 6), allowing the constant to vary in-
dependently for each state in which an ethnic conflict has occurred. 
this design captures time-invariant country-specific features that are 
not captured by our independent variables. the results confirm the ro-
bustness of our main hypotheses, except h3. Whereas the status vari-
86 makdisi and sadaka 2005, 61.
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ables and size indicator influence the dependent variable, the impact of 
past conflict cannot be statistically confirmed due to the low variance 
among the country-observations that experienced conflict. moreover, 
in what is a clear shortcoming, fixed-effects estimation excludes from 
the analysis all countries that never experience conflict.87
87 beck and katz 2001.
tAble 3
sensitivity AnAlysis






Excluded 1.2534** 1.3262** 1.3904**
(0.2652) (0.2960) (0.3780)
Downgraded 1.5911** 1.5821** 1.8696**
(0.4001) (0.3117) (0.4909)
log (Group size) 0.2906** 0.2595** 0.3919**
(0.0893) (0.0785) (0.0970)
past conflict 0.8388** 0.1138 0.6797*
(0.1662) (0.2378) (0.2692)
log (gdp per capita), lagged –0.2232 0.0228 –0.5069**
(0.1155) (0.2400) (0.1243)
log (population), lagged –0.0335 0.3558 –0.0172
(0.0955) (0.3573) (0.0995)
years since last conflict onset –0.1582* –0.1432* –0.1888
(0.0731) (0.0624) (0.0969)










peace years splines yes yes yes
country Fixed Effects no yes no
Decade Fixed Effects no no no
constant –5.2080** –25.1064 –2.8117*
(1.5947) (0.0000) (1.3791)
observations 24445 15734 24445
robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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in order to test whether our models are sensitive to the intensity of 
conflicts, we replace the coding of the dependent variable based on the 
twenty-five battle deaths threshold with one that conforms to the one 
thousand battle deaths threshold conventionally used to define civil 
wars, while otherwise keeping model 1 unchanged. model 7 shows that 
our results hold in predicting the onset of this smaller set of seventy-
six high-intensity conflicts. the variables associated with the main hy-
potheses retain their effect, as does the gdp per Capita variable.
our results are also robust to various changes in the operationaliza-
tion of our key variables (results not shown). For example, varying the 
two-year window used to calculate the Downgraded variable to one-, 
three-, four-, or five-year windows makes no substantive difference for 
our results. As discussed in the context of elite infighting, the coding of 
our dependent variable allows us to check whether our findings differ 
for secessionist and nonsecessionist conflicts. Whereas this is the case 
for elite infighting, all the main hypotheses hold robustly for seces-
sionist and nonsecessionist conflicts fought in the name of excluded 
groups.
Finally, our results are also robust to controls for regime type and 
time trends (results not shown). Democracies are no less likely than 
autocracies to experience ethnic conflict, contrary to the expectations 
of democratic civil peace theory. the relationship between anocracy 
and ethnic conflict is less clear and depends on whether anocracy is 
defined using the standard polity scores or based on alternative coding 
schemes.88 Given the long time frame of our study, we examined the 
potential effects of temporal and geopolitical trends by adding a cold 
war dummy, a calendar year variable, and decade fixed effects. none of 
these variables reduces the statistical or substantive significance of our 
main findings.
conclusion
in this article we have investigated the influence of ethnic power in-
equality on civil war and found that exclusion and competition along 
ethnic lines are strongly associated with internal conflict. rather than 
continuing to debate whether or not ethnic diversity or polarization 
breeds conflict, quantitative researchers might want to try identifying 
88 Vreeland 2008 reports that polity-based codings of regime type are endogenous to civil war and 
offers corrected regime variables. in our model, anocracies classified using standard polity scores are 
significantly more conflict prone than other regime types, but the significance disappears when using 
the Vreeland coding.
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those ethnic constellations of power that are particularly war prone. 
the article contributes to this endeavor by showing that once ethnic 
politics is properly conceptualized and measured, it is indeed possible 
to identify the conditions under which ethnonationalist civil wars are 
more likely to break out. large ethnic groups that are excluded from 
state power or underrepresented in government are much more likely to 
challenge the regime’s insiders through violent means. Also in keeping 
with our theoretical expectations, a loss of power in recent history or 
previous conflict further increases the likelihood of armed conflict.
readers who are familiar with the qualitative scholarship on eth-
nic conflict may not be surprised that representatives of ethnic groups 
with less access to power are more likely to challenge the government. 
however, this finding is far from trivial. indeed, the most widely cited 
articles in the recent civil war literature contend that ethnic diversity 
is unrelated to the likelihood of conflict and conclude that ethnicity 
thus does not matter for understanding war and peace.89 introduc-
ing a stark opposition between matters of motivation and legitimacy 
(“grievances”), on the one hand, and factors related to the military and 
economic feasibility of insurgencies, on the other hand, these scholars 
argue that ethnic grievances are too ubiquitous to explain the rare event 
of civil war. Without denying the relevance of feasibility mechanisms, 
our findings show that ethnicity should not be discounted as an ex-
planatory factor in the study of civil wars. We demonstrate empirically 
how the logics of contention and mobilization lead ethnically defined 
actors who are excluded from state power into armed conflict. roughly 
half of the conflicts fought since the second World War can be linked 
to this dynamic of ethnopolitical struggle for state power.
how do our findings relate to existing research on ethnic conflict? As 
suggested above, past quantitative tests of how political exclusion and 
discrimination relate to the propensity of violence have produced con-
flicting results. We argue that sample selection and data quality prob-
lems are responsible for this inconclusiveness and believe that our new 
data set on ethnic power relations (epr) represents significant prog-
ress by enabling more precise coding of political representation in state 
governments, including that of dominant majorities or power-sharing 
partners. since the epr data set is time sensitive, it also permits tracing 
changes in power access and determining whether such changes affect 
the conflict dynamic over time. on the basis of this improved data set, 
we are able to establish an unequivocal relationship between the degree 
of access to state power and the likelihood of armed rebellion.
89 Fearon and laitin 2003; collier and hoeffler 2004.
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While improving on previous studies of ethnic conflict, our research 
also has limitations that we intend to address in the future. First, despite 
our efforts to capture time-sensitive mechanisms, our focus has been 
mostly on structural conditions rather than on dynamic and strategic 
processes of contention and mobilization. second, we have not tried to 
explain changes in power structures and the political relevance of differ-
ent ethnic categories but have treated these instead as exogenously given. 
third, due to limited data availability, we have refrained from analyzing 
the effects of cross-border relationships between ethnic kin, settlement 
patterns, and institutional factors relating to party systems and electoral 
institutions. indeed, this study is written as an invitation to fill these 
gaps by collecting more precise data on ethnic organizations, their mo-
bilizational capacities and power resources, and their interactions with 
each other as well as with nonethnic organizations and governmental 
actors, inside or across state borders. ideally, such data would make it 
possible to develop a fully processual theory that will allow us to ana-
lyze ethnic conflicts as a specific conjuncture in the ongoing struggle 
over state power between dynamically evolving sets of actors.
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